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Ole, a fifty-eight-year-old truck driver, is hired in Minnesota (by a
corporation registered in Minnesota and Wisconsin) and works fifty percent
in Minnesota and fifty percent in Wisconsin. En route to Milwaukee for a
delivery, on June 1, 2014, he trips in a pothole at a sex toy shop in Delevan,
Wisconsin after stopping for lunch and drinking six beers. Ole falls and
injuries his neck, leaving a wicked scar on his forehead. He has neck fusion
surgery and is assigned a healing plateau December 31, 2014, with these
permanent restrictions: no lifting over twenty pounds and no driving more
than fifty minutes. These restrictions preclude his return to work with his
employer. Ole finished the eleventh grade and has no GED. Prior to his
injury, Ole earned $1500 per week. He calls your office for help...
The increasing geographic complexity of interstate and
international employment relationships makes current
2
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jurisdictional issues more problematic than in the early days of
workers' compensation. The scenario above poses a plethora of
problems for the practitioner: jurisdiction, "course of employment"
standards, alcohol as a causative agent, and a panoply of benefits
issues. The authors will discuss a baker's dozen of these below,
indicating the relevant considerations in Wisconsin and Minnesota.
Exploring the relative benefits of Wisconsin, vis-di-vis Minnesota,
may prove productive. In some instances, Wisconsin's benefits
exceed adjoining states' or provide a benefit not available in
another state (for example, minimum permanency percentages for
certain surgical procedures or better vocational rehabilitation
benefits). Minnesota, however, may have better temporary and
permanency benefits.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, liability for compensation "exists whenever an
employee sustains an injury, at a time [when] both the employer
and employee are subject to the provisions of [Wisconsin's
Workers' Compensation Act]."' "[W]here a Wisconsin employer
and an employee have established an employment status in
Wisconsin, Uurisdiction exists] even though the contract of
employment was made elsewhere, the injury occurred elsewhere,
and the injured" worker lives in another state.2 "Once [the]
employment status [has] been established," it is immaterial
whether the claimant was in Wisconsin at the time of injury.3
If an employee working outside Wisconsin suffers a
compensable injury, Wisconsin's Workers' Compensation Act
applies, under certain conditions.' In some circumstances, the
employee may meet the criteria for workers' compensation benefits
in more than one state. In such instances, Wisconsin follows the
McCartin rule. Where payment has been made in another
jurisdiction and Wisconsin jurisdiction is also claimed, the
Wisconsin insurer receives a credit for all previously paid
1. Simonton v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 214 N.W.2d 302,
306 (Wis. 1974).
2. Id. at 308.
3. Id.
4. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
1352 [Vol. 41:4
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compensation. On the other hand, other jurisdictions, while
providing successive awards, may honor a claim for reimbursement
of the Wisconsin workers' compensation payments.
B. Minnesota
In Minnesota, unless an exception applies, the Minnesota
Workers' Compensation Statute does not cover injuries that occur
outside of the state and no jurisdiction may be exercised under said
statute.6 There are two exceptions to this rule:
(1) When the employee regularly performs the primary duties of
his employment in Minnesota.
(2) When an employee is hired in Minnesota and injured "while
temporarily employed outside of [Minnesota] ."
Exception #1: Regular Performance of Primary Duties in Minnesota
The Minnesota Workers' Compensation Statute will apply to
"an employee who regularly performs the primary duties of
employment within [Minnesota]" and is injured while outside of
Minnesota. 9 The phrase "regularly performs" is not rigid; it must be
viewed in terms of the nature of the work performed by the
employee on the whole. The term "primary duties" refers to
something fundamental or basic about the employment being
performed in Minnesota. It does not require that the employee
spend more time performing job duties in Minnesota than
elsewhere.10 Such an approach has been specifically rejected."
Case law on this subject strongly favors granting jurisdiction.
As long as there is any regular task that is in some manner
fundamental or basic to the performance of the employee's job
duties, jurisdiction will be granted. For example, in the case of a
traveling operations director who spent three out of every four
5. Indus. Comm'n of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 629 (1947). Where
dual jurisdiction existed in both Illinois and Wisconsin and an initial award was
obtained in Illinois, the employee was allowed to obtain additional benefits in
Wisconsin with credit given for any sum received in Illinois. Id.
6. MINN. STAT. § 176.041, subdiv. 5a (2014).
7. Id. § 176.041, subdiv. 2.
8. Id. § 176.041, subdiv. 3.
9. Id. § 176.041, subdiv. 2.
10. Gillund v. Royal/Milbank Ins. Co., 46 W.C.D. 520, 523-24 (Minn.
WCCA), affd, 485 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1992).
11. Id.
13532015]
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weeks outside of the State of Minnesota, jurisdiction was granted,
because the one week spent in Minnesota per month was a
"fundamental or basic part" of the employee's job duties."
Exception #2: Employee Hired in Minnesota but Injured While Temporarily
Employed Out-of-State
The Minnesota Workers' Compensation Statute will also apply
to "an employee [who is] hired in [Minnesota] by a Minnesota
employer" and is injured "while temporarily employed outside of
[Minnesota]."' All three of these requirements must be met for
jurisdiction to attach.14
Minnesota courts have taken an expansive view of what
constitutes being "hired in Minnesota." As long as the offer of
employment is made from Minnesota and constitutes the final
word on employment, it will constitute a hiring in Minnesota for
jurisdictional purposes. 15 Additionally, jurisdiction was found in the
case where an employment offer was extended from Minnesota and
the employee had to travel to Iowa for mandatory drug testing and
training, so it would appear that absolute finality in the hiring is
not always required for the order to constitute being "hired in
Minnesota."''
Whether or not an employer is considered a "Minnesota
employer" turns on the nature and extent of the employer's' 7
activities in Minnesota. The state of incorporation is not
12. Burgard v. Innworks, Inc., 1996 WL 265825, at *5-6 (Minn. WCCA May
6, 1996).
13. MINN. STAT. § 176.041, subdiv. 3.
14. See Wood v. Fred Madsen Constr. Co., 49 W.C.D. 569, 572-74 (Minn.
WCCA), affd, 512 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 1993).
15. See McCoy v. Ingersoll/Rand, 40 W.C.D. 1027, 1031-32 (Minn. WCCA
1987), affd, 423 N.W.2d 685 (Minn. 1988) (finding that acceptance of an oral
contract to hire in Minnesota constituted hiring in Minnesota, even when the
phone call originated out of state). But see Pauley v. Donco Carriers, Inc., 46
W.C.D. 14, 16-17 (Minn. WCCA 1991), affd, 478 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1992)
(finding that hiring contingent upon passing a safety clearance was not complete
until the clearance was approved; since approval occurred out of state, the hiring
also occurred out of state).
16. Sterling ex rel. Spain v. Fagen, Inc., 69 W.C.D. 459, 465-66 (Minn. WCCA
2009).
17. Rundberg v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, 51 W.C.D. 193, 201 (Minn.
WCCA), affd, 520 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1994).
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necessary,18 although incorporating in Minnesota would assure
status as a Minnesota employer. Other relevant factors include
whether the employer has any offices or facilities in Minnesota.
1 9
Finally, the employee must be "temporarily employed" outside
of Minnesota for jurisdiction to apply under this exception. The
key factor here is the permanency (or lack thereof) of the
employee's performance in another state.'z Generally, so long as
the work the employee is performing outside of Minnesota is not
intended to be permanent and/or a relocation, he will be deemed
to be "temporarily employed" and jurisdiction will be found. A
transient employee who travels from site to site to perform work
will be deemed to be "temporarily employed" out-of-state if there is
some major contact with Minnesota, such as the facility which
directs his movements, pay, or other administrative matters being
located in Minnesota. zl
Ole's employment would very likely result in Minnesota
jurisdiction under the first of the above-referenced exceptions.
Certainly he performed "primary duties" in Minnesota because he
did fifty percent of his driving there. Under the second exception,
the facts explain he was hired in Minnesota and he was temporarily
outside of Minnesota on a run to Milwaukee.
Ultimately, Ole would have a choice of jurisdiction (i.e.,
whether to file his claim in Wisconsin or Minnesota).
II. LIABILITY/CAUSATION
A. "In the Course of Employment" Issues
1. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, where an injury occurs in the course and scope
of employment and all the following elements are met, the
worker's exclusive remedy against the employer is workers'
compensation:
18. Id. at 201-02.
19. Letourneau v. Benson Elec., 1998 WL 365342, at *4-5 (Minn. WCCA
June 16, 1998).
20. See Fischer v. Malleable Iron Co., 303 Minn. 1, 4-5, 225 N.W.2d 542, 545
(1975).
21. See Vaughn v. Nelson Bros. Constr., 520 N.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Minn.
1994).
13552015]
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(1) An injury has occurred.
(2) An employee-employer relationship exists.
(3) The injury has occurred in the course and scope of
employment.
(4) The injury is not self-inflicted.
22(5) The injury arises out of employment.
As a long haul truck driver, Ole is a "traveling employee,"
which provides more latitude regarding whether he is "deviating,"
and thus not in the course of employment.
Traveling employees receive broad workers' compensation
coverage in Wisconsin under a three-step analysis:
(1) Traveling employees are deemed to be in the course of
employment at all times while on a trip ("portal to portal"),
(2) "[e]xcept when engaged in a deviation for a private or
personal purpose," and
(3) acts reasonably necessary for or incidental to living are not
21deviations.
The traveling employee provision was created to remedy
situations in which employees, whose work required them to live
away from home for periods of time, were not compensated for
injuries sustained during normal activities of daily living on a
business trip.24
22. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(a)-(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
23. Id. § 102.03(1)(f) (Westlaw). The statute permits compensation to
injured traveling employees under these circumstances:
Every employee whose employment requires the employee to travel
shall be deemed to be performing service growing out of and
incidental to the employee's employment at all times while on a trip,
except when engaged in a deviation for a private or personal purpose.
Acts reasonably necessary for living or incidental thereto shall not be
regarded as such a deviation. Any accident or disease arising out of a
hazard of such service shall be deemed to arise out of the employee's
employment.
Id. (Westlaw).
24. The traveling employees statute was created by the Act of Aug. 20, 1945,
ch. 537, 1945 Wis. Sess. Laws 963. Creamery Package Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 248 N.W. 140, 143 (Wis. 1933), is an example of an outcome that
section 102.03(1) (f) of Wisconsin Statutes was meant to remedy. In that case the
court held that an employee's contraction of typhoid fever was not compensable
because it was only conjecture that the employee contracted the disease during
the exact time he was traveling for his employer. See Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 248
1356 [Vol. 41:4
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Wisconsin's Supreme Court has issued a "presumption that a
traveling employee performs services incidental to his employment
at all times on a business trip," with the burden of proving a
deviation falling to the employer. 25 The presumption is rebutted by
a fact scenario indicating intent to abandon 
employment.
However, if the facts only lead to "mere speculation" that the
employee abandoned employment, the presumption in favor of
continuing employment benefits remains.2 7 Additionally, the
presumption favoring traveling employees does not modify the
"arising out of' requirement that a hazard of employment must• . 28
cause the injury, 2 nor does the presumption trump solely personal
29
injury causation.
N.W. at 141-43; see also Gibbs Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 10 N.W.2d 130, 130-31
(Wis. 1943) (finding that a traveling employee's fall in a bathtub was not
compensable because bathing does not arise out of employment).
25. See CBS, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 579 N.W.2d 668, 675
(Wis. 1998).
26. Dibble v. Indus. Comm'n (Dep't of I. L. H. R.), 161 N.W.2d 913, 916-18
(Wis. 1968) (rejecting compensation for employee killed in auto accident
traveling in a direction away from his motel). But see City of Phillips v. Dep't of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 202 N.W.2d 249, 254-55 (Wis. 1972) (affirming
compensation for a drunk employee's pedestrian-vehicle death when wandering
away from motel).
27. See Hansen v. Indus. Comm'n, 46 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Wis. 1951) (holding
in favor of dead plaintiff found some distance away from where he had ea:ten
dinner). The Hansen court found that a traveling employee need not "seek
immediate seclusion in a hotel and remain away from human beings at the risk of
being charged with deviating from his employment. Nor is he required to eat his
evening meal at the restaurant nearest to the spot where he takes leave of his
customer." Id.
28. See Goranson v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 289 N.W.2d
270, 280 (Wis. 1980) (affirming denial of benefits). Applicant, a bus driver, was
staying in a hotel room as part of his job requirements when he drunkenlyjumped
(or was pushed) out of the window. Id. at 272-73. The continuing employment
presumption was tested, and the court rejected the argument that in order to
rebut the presumed fact of continuing employment, an employer must do so by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 277-78. The employer need not disprove
the presumed fact of continuing employment by a preponderance of the evidence;
the presumption of continuing employment is met only when there is nothing
appearing to the contrary. Id. at 277.
29. See, e.g., Keene v. L & S Trucking, No. 2008-037854, 2011 WL 6363680, at
*3, *6-7 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Nov. 30, 2011) (denying trucker's
claim, concluding that the "stroke did not arise out of employment but was due to
circumstances solely personal to him").
135720151
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The Commission must deal with fact issues determining
whether an employee obtains "traveling employee" status, rather
than that of a commuting employee with a fixed place of business.
"Traveling" status was granted to an employee traveling off
premises for a smoke, working on an out-of-town contract
assignment,30 and bicycling to a required seminar to retain a
physician's license. Where several business-related reasons for a
trip were raised but found unsubstantiated, an applicant was
deemed commuting-not traveling-and compensation was
denied.32
Courts have addressed acts reasonably necessary for or
incidental to living. While eating appears to be reasonably
necessary, a trip thirty miles across the state border for lunch was
held unreasonable. 3 Sleeping is also reasonably necessary for
living, but an injury sustained driving in a direction away from the
motel and jumping (or being pushed) out a hotel window
stemming from a likely immoral or a personally caused purpose is
not covered.35
Injuries incurred by traveling employees engaged in
reasonable recreation are covered: Such widely varied activities as
30. Relyea v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 2001-019385, 2003 WL 21349599, at *1, *6-7
(Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n May 29, 2003).
31. Holliday v. Milwaukee Med. Clinic, No. 2003-03931, 2005 WL 1658466, at
*1-4 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'nJune 28, 2005).
32. See Worth v. Eclipse Mfg. Co., No. 1996-046673, 2001 WL 892496, at *1,
*3 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'nJuly 10, 2001).
33. Neese v. State Med. Soc'y of Wis., 153 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 1967). The trip
from Houlton, Wisconsin, to the high-end Charlie's restaurant in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, was too far because "there were several good and adequate eating
establishments within the course of travel." Id. at 559.
34. Dibble v. Indus. Comm'n (Dep't. of I. L. H. R.), 161 N.W.2d 913, 914-15
(Wis. 1968).
35. Goranson v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 289 N.W.2d 270,
273 (Wis. 1980).
36. In 1945, the Industrial Commission interpreted the new traveling
employee statute as follows:
This provides that employees who travel shall be entitled to benefits for
injury while on a trip, including injuries sustained in trains, cabs,
eating places, hotels and other places of sojourn, provided the
employee has not deviated for a private or personal purpose. Acts
reasonably necessary for living, such as eating, bathing, sleeping, etc.
are not to be regarded as a deviation. Injuries occurring because of
hotel fires, collapse of buildings, accidents on trains and other
1358 [Vol. 41:4
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skiing, shopping, drinking, and swimming have been found
37
compensable under the traveling employee statute. Recent court
cases confirm that traveling employees may participate in
reasonable recreational activities without deviating from their
employment. An employee is not required to seek immediate
seclusion in a hotel and to remain away from human beings to
avoid the risk of being charged with deviation from employment.
For example, injury during an extended trip following a business
conference was found compensable, where the extended time
benefited the employer by flight-cost savings, and the trip was a
39
reasonable distance from the conference site.
An employee who returns to the course of employment after
deviating for a personal purpose can receive compensation. The
geographic site of the injury is significant: the employee may
reclaim "course of employment" status when re-entering the
normal route of business travel after the deviation. 40 A "meaningful
manifestation to engage in activities purely personal to the
41
employee" will substantiate a deviation.
conveyances will clearly be covered.
17 THOMAS M. DOMER & CHARLES F. DOMER, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW§ 11:19 n.14 (2014-15 ed.).
37. CBS, Inc., v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 579 N.W.2d 668 (Wis.
1998).
38. See CBS, Inc., 579 N.W.2d at 676, where the court found that a skiing
incident was compensable for an employee who was injured on his day off. The
CBS supervisor had suggested the trip and provided transport and lift tickets; the
test of reasonableness remained, however, despite local custom. CBS, Inc. v. Labor
& Indus. Review Comm'n, 570 N.W.2d 446, 449 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 579
N.W.2d 668. The underlying court of appeals decision, affirmed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, found that "[t]he mere fact that a certain town is populated with
avid cliff divers does not by itself make cliff diving an activity reasonably necessary
to living." Id.
39. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 595 N.W.2d 23,
30 (Wis. 1999).
40. See Lager v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 185 N.W.2d 300,
304 (Wis. 1971) (holding that a salesman on a trip who deviates to spend several
hours in a tavern-"a frolic of his own"-before being killed on his regular route
home may regain the course of employment coverage). But see Tyrrell v. Indus.
Comm'n, 133 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Wis. 1965) (holding that the employee "was not
acting within the scope of his employment because the predominant purpose of
his journey... was not business orientated").
41. Tyrrell, 133 N.W.2d at 814; see also Adamski v. Stevens Point Area Pub.
Sch., No. 2008-006551, 2009 WL 4822333, at *10 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm'n Nov. 30, 2009) (holding that a teacher did not engage in a deviation
2015] 1359
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Thus, in Wisconsin, a truck driver's stop at a sex-toy shop may
be considered "incidental to living," and not a deviation. The
distance from his direct route, the time spent there, and the
employer's former condonation of such trips may also play a role.
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, an injury must occur "in the course of
employment" in order to be compensable.4 This is a term of art
that refers to the location and circumstances of the accident that
caused the employee's injury. 4' Generally, this requirement is not
met unless the injury occurs on the employer's premises or on
some premises where the employee is required to be in order to
render services on behalf of the employer.44 However, there are
numerous exceptions to this general rule, including the "traveling
,,45
employee.
Ole is a "traveling employee" because his work requires him to
drive to various locations in order to make deliveries on behalf of
the employer. As in Wisconsin, traveling employees receive broad
workers' compensation coverage in Minnesota. Traveling
employees are deemed to be in the course of employment at all
times while on a trip that was in service to the employer. Injuries
sustained on any such trip will be compensable. The course ofemployment burden is generally met by demonstrating that the trip
from the business trip by making a brief stop en route to lunch, which is incidental
to an act reasonably necessary for living).
42. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subdiv. 1 (2014).
43. See Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 207, 118 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1962)
("'[A] rising out of . . . refers to the causal connection between the employment
and the injury, whereas the term 'in the course of' refers to the time, place, and
circumstances of the accident causing the injury.").
44. MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subdiv. 16.
45. Id. ("Where the employer regularly furnished transportation to
employees to and from the place of employment, those employees are subject to
this chapter while being so transported.").
46. See, e.g., Lundgaard v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension, 306 Minn. 421, 237 N.W.2d 617 (1975); Schwalbe v. Am. Red
Cross, 72 W.C.D. 121 (Minn. WCCA 2011), affd, 811 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 2012).
But see, e.g., Funk v. A.F. Scheppmann & Son Constr. Co., 294 Minn. 483, 199
N.W.2d 791 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that an employee using his employer's
vehicle for personal convenience is not in the service of the employer and thus
injury was not compensable).
1360 [Vol. 41:4
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was in the interests of the employer and that the employee was paid
wages for his travel and/or reimbursed for his travel expenses.
However, deviation from the employee's business trip for
personal reasons takes the employee out of the course of
employment until the personal "deviation" ends and the employee
resumes travel towards the "business goal., 48 Several factors go into
determining whether the employee has deviated. These include the
length or duration of the deviation, whether the path taken to and
from the alleged deviation was on the same direct route the
employee would have taken on the business trip regardless of the
alleged deviation, and whether any of the employee's activities
during the alleged deviation served any of the employer's business• .,49
interests (even if insignificantly) .
Not all personal acts are deviations. For example, normal acts
committed for the employee's personal comfort, such as using a
restroom, eating a meal, and resting or sleeping at a hotel or motel
are not deviations and injuries sustained during such activities are
compensable if the employer could reasonably foresee the hazard
that created the injury.5 Everyday hazards incidental to life are
foreseeable to the employer. Injuries sustained by employees on
business trips as the result of hotel fires, food poisoning, and from
47. See Tyrrell v. Indus. Comm'n, 133 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Wis. 1965); Adamski
v. Stevens Point Area Pub. Sch., No. 2008-006551, 2009 WL 4822333, at *3 (Wis.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Nov. 30, 2009); see also Gene P. Bradt, An
Examination of the "Arising out of' and "in the Course of' Requirements Under the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Law, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 559 (1980).
48. Williams v. Hoyt Constr. Co., 306 Minn. 59, 69, 237 N.W.2d 339, 346
(1975).
49. See, e.g., Mills v. Standard Parts Serv. Co., 269 Minn. 501, 504, 131 N.W.2d
546, 548 (1964) (denying compensation for an employee who was on business trip
between two stores and stopped for lunch, then resumed towards the second store
and subsequently injured himself, because the injury occurred on a route that
would not have been taken if the employee had not stopped for lunch); Rhea v.
Overholt, 222 Minn. 467, 471, 25 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1946); Nehring v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., 193 Minn. 169, 171, 258 N.W. 307, 308 (1935) (finding that
extremely minimal deviations do not remove the employee from the course of
employment); Geldert v. Hennepin Cnty. Adult Corr., 1999 WL 1034701, at *4
(Minn. WCCA Oct. 20, 1999) (holding that an employee who was required to
travel between different worksites throughout the day, but was injured after a trip
home to retrieve a forgotten driver's license and parking card, was not performing
a specific work duty).
50. Epp v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 296 Minn. 231, 235, 208 N.W.2d 87, 89
(1973).
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choking while eating have all been compensable, 51 because it is
reasonably foreseeable to the employer that a traveling employee
will stop to eat and sleep.
Compensability extends beyond personal comfort. Ultimately
any reasonable activity "which may normally be expected of a
52traveling employee" is compensable. This includes recreational
activities during a business trip, such as visiting a bar while not on
duty.5 In order for an activity to not be reasonably foreseeable
under Epp and Voight, it must be "clearly unanticipated,
unforeseeable and extraordinary., 54 In reality, very few cases fall
into this category. For example, in Shirkey v. J & R Schugel Trucking,
Inc., the employee, while on a layover, left a very valuable cargo
load completely unsecured, a clear violation of company policy,
and proceeded to walk several miles to a bar and restaurant.
While at the bar, he drank several beers in violation of company
policy.5 6 He then walked through farm fields in the wintertime,
without a coat or flashlight, on his way back to his truck.57 He was
injured when he fell off of a culvert.5 The court affirmed on appeal
that the injury was compensable on the basis that, despite its
prohibitions against the activity engaged in by the employee, his
conduct was reasonably foreseeable to the employer and not
extraordinary.9
Under Minnesota law, in Ole's case, his initial stop for lunch
may not have constituted a deviation. It was reasonably foreseeable
to the employer that he would need to stop to eat for his personal
comfort. However, Ole clearly deviated from his business trip in
order to consume alcohol and purchase goods at the sex shop.
There was no business purpose to these activities. Further,
consuming alcohol while operating a commercial trucking vehicle
would likely be considered extraordinary, as would stopping at a
51. See id. at 232, 208 N.W.2d at 88 (injury walking to hotel); Snyder v. Gen.
Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 377, 152 N.W.2d 743, 744 (1967) (choking);
Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 3, 183 N.W. 977, 977 (1921) (motel
fire).
52. Voight v. Rettinger Transp., Inc., 306 N.W.2d 133, 138 (Minn. 1981).
53. Id.
54. Id.; seeEpp, 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87.
55. 72 W.C.D. 239, 241-43 (Minn. WCCA 2012).
56. Id. at 241.
57. Id. at 242.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 241.
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sex shop. Therefore, it is most likely that Ole will be deemed
outside the course of employment at the time of the injury and
thus it will not be compensable.
B. Involvement of Alcohol
1. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, if an injury results from the intoxication (by
alcohol or drugs), benefits may be reduced by fifteen percent as an
employee safety violation, 60 but intoxication is not evidence of a
deviation if the employee is otherwise in the course of
employment.61
The much-heralded "frozen fingers" case, Heritage Mutual
62
Insurance Co. v. Larsen, confirmed that rule. Intoxication will not,
by itself, take an employee out of the course of employment, even
when the intoxication is several times the legal limit. Thus, in
Wisconsin, Ole's consumption of six beers would likely not be a bar
to compensation, but may result in reduced benefits if alcohol
caused the injury.
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, intoxication can bar compensation if, and only
if, it is the proximate cause of the injury.64 This is an affirmative
defense and the burden of proof is on the employer.6 5 The
employer can offer both direct and circumstantial evidence
60. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.58 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
61. Gimbel Bros. v. Indus. Comm'n, 282 N.W. 78, 81 (Wis. 1938).
62. 2001 WI 30, 242 Wis. 2d 47, 624 N.W.2d 129. The applicant was
intoxicated returning to his home, which doubled as a sales office. Id. 1 2. After
passing out outside on the porch while trying and failing to enter the home, the
applicant spent the night exposed to sub-zero temperatures, ultimately resulting in
partial amputation of his frostbitten fingers and thumb. Id. The employee was
compensated as a traveling employee because his frostbite occurred as a result of
the zone of special danger (cold weather) created by his employment, though the
award was reduced by fifteen percent for the intoxication. Id. 51, 70.
63. City of Phillips v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 202 N.W.2d
249, 254-55 (Wis. 1972). While at a convention a sheriff with a blood alcohol
count of 0.24 walked into roadway and was struck and killed by a motorist. Id. His
estate was awarded benefits. Id.
64. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subdiv. 1 (2014).
65. Id.
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regarding the employee's intoxication, including evidence of blood
alcohol level, eyewitness testimony regarding the employee's
behavior and mannerisms, the employee's conduct before the
injury, and the employee's personal tolerance for alcohol. In
practice, proving that the employee's intoxication was the
proximate cause of the injury may mean eliminating all other67
possible causes. For example, in Shirkey, the employee's
intoxication was not found to be the proximate cause of the
employee's injuries because an alternative cause-the employee
being startled by headlights of an oncoming vehicle-led him to68
fall down an embankment. His claim was therefore held to be
compensable. 69
Under Minnesota law, in Ole's case, it is unlikely on the facts
presented that the employer will be able to prove that his
intoxication was the proximate cause of his injury. There are many
other potential causes for falling into a pothole (inattention, his
view of the pothole was obstructed, etc.).
C. "Arising out of Employment"
1. Wisconsin
The words "arising out of' employment are not the same as
"caused by" the employment.70 Outside of Wisconsin law, historical
cases suggest four basic interpretations of the phrase "arising out of
employment": (1) the peculiar or increased risk doctrine, wherein
the accident arises out of employment only when it arises out of a
66. Lowrey v. Interlock Decorating, 54 W.C.D. 36, 37, 40-42 (Minn. WCCA
1995), affd, 544 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 1996) (discussing testimony regarding an
employee's conduct and behavior); see also Thake v. Backhauls, Inc., 345 N.W.2d
745, 747-48 (Minn. 1984) (stating that employers may prove their affirmative
intoxication defense by direct or circumstantial evidence and discussing alcohol
tolerance); Manthey v. Charles E. Bernick, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 1981)
(discussing blood alcohol concentration and tolerance in relation to proving
proximate cause).
67. See Ball by Mancino v. Pear One, Inc., 67 W.C.D. 31, 44 (Minn. WCCA),
affd, 726 N.W.2d 454 (Minn. 2006).
68. Shirkey v. J & R Schugel Trucking, Inc., 72 W.C.D. 239, 250, 254 (Minn.
WCCA 2012). Note that in Shirkey, there were no blood alcohol tests conducted.
See id. Proof of intoxication and the extent thereof via such tests may have been
helpful to the intoxication defense.
69. Id. at 254.
70. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 92 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Wis. 1958).
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hazard peculiar to or increased by the employment and the hazard
is not common to most people generally; (2) the actual risk
doctrine, wherein an accident arises out of the employment if the
employment subjects the employee to the actual risk which injured
him although such risk is also common to the public; (3) the
proximate cause interpretation, which implies negligence or fault;
and (4) the positional risk interpretation, wherein the "arising out
of' criteria is met when, by reason or obligation of employment,
the employee is present at a time and place and injured by a non-
personal force (i.e., hazard of employment)."
In Wisconsin, the "arising out of employment" test follows the
"positional risk" doctrine.72 Where the obligation or circumstances
of the employment place the employee in the particular time and
place when injured by a force not solely personal to the employee,
the "positional risk" doctrine dictates that workers' compensation
liability will be found.
73
Generally, a "zone of special danger" accompanies a finding of
positional risk liability." Positional risk applies to danger inherent
in a building layout (such as sidewalk configuration) 5 and building
71. Id.; see 1 LEx K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION [Aw §§ 3.03D-.06D (2013) (discussing the five current
interpretations).
72. Cutter-Hammer, Inc., 92 N.W.2d at 827-28.
73. Id. The court found that a concrete stairway created a special zone- of
hazard and that an accidental fall down steps arose out of employment. Id. at 828;
see also Allied Mfg., Inc. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 173 N.W.2d
690, 692-93 (Wis. 1970) (holding a death compensable, and the positional risk
doctrine applicable, when an employee was alone after hours in the building and
was stabbed by an unknown assailant).
74. See Freeman v. Dane Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 2005-002204, 2006 WL
2330522 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n July 11, 2006). The Commission
notes: "Applying the 'positional risk' doctrine it has been said accidents arise out
of employment if the conditions or obligations of the employment create a zone of
special danger out of which the accident causing the injury arose." Id. at 4
(quoting Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 92 N.W.2d at 828). The applicant experienced back
pain while walking and wearing body armor on a level and unobstructed floor;
accordingly, the Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC)
determined that there was no zone of special danger, and the claim was dismissed.
Id. at *2, *4.
75. See Schampers v. First Choice Auto, Inc., No. 2003-011262, 2006 WL
1367949 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Apr. 14, 2006). The applicant was a
morbidly obese man who injured his knee when he lost his balance turning a
corner on a sidewalk. Id. at *2. The administrative law judge (ALJ) and LIRC
determined that the sidewalk configuration (being a corner with a slope that leads
2015] 1365
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fixtures (such as door jambs and slippery floor material). 76 In one
Wisconsin case, the applicant slipped on tile flooring and fell into a
door jamb." The administrative law judge (ALJ) and Wisconsin
Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) found that the fall
was not idiopathic and, under the positional risk doctrine, the
applicant would not have fallen if the floor had been made of a less
slippery material and would not have been injured if the doorjamb
78
had not been there. Therefore, the applicant was awarded
benefits.79
Arguably, positional risk would also apply to most motor
vehicle accidents, even when the initial injury may be due to a
personal cause to the driver (stroke, seizure, blackout, etc.)."
Purely personal assaults (bearing no relation to an individual's
employment status or location) generally will not trigger "arising
out of' coverage based on positional risk.8' However, if a condition
of employment facilitates the injury, positional risk applies."2 The
courts have indicated that positional risk applies to certain
occupations where the zone of danger accompanies the job, such
as bank teller, gas station attendant, and convenience store
worker.8 3
Thus, in Wisconsin, an argument could be made that the
circumstances of Ole's employment (over-the-road trucking) and
to a crosswalk) was enough of a factor to satisfy the positional risk doctrine. Id. at
*5-6. The applicant was awarded benefits. Id. at *6.
76. See Harris v. AS1HA Family Services, Inc., 2005 WL 328097, No. 2002-
045614, at *1-2 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Jan. 26, 2005).
77. Id. at *I.
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id.
80. See Smith v. Kitson Mktg., Inc., No. 1997-058052, 1999 WL 296809 (Wis.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Apr. 27, 1999). Smith had a seizure in his car and
slumped over, resulting in arm problems. Id. at *3. Applying the positional risk
doctrine, LIRC found that it was not the seizure, but the fact that he "slumped
over which resulted in him laying across the console and bucket seat in his
automobile for six hours, which led to his brachial plexopathy and resulting arm
problems." Id. at *1.
81. Allied Mfg., Inc. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 173
N.W.2d 690, 692 (Wis. 1970).
82. Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 559 N.W.2d 588, 594 (Wis. 1997). The city's
release of personal information to an abusive ex-spouse led to an emotional injury
caused by harassing phone calls at home. Id. at 590, 595.
83. See, e.g., Allied Mfg., Inc., 173 N.W.2d at 692.
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exposure to such hazards as potholes, would trigger liability under
"positional risk." This is the most unlikely theory of recovery.
2. Minnesota
Minnesota does not have a positional risk doctrine.
s
8 Rather,
Minnesota employs an "increased risk" test.
s5 The employee must
demonstrate that her employment "exposed her to a risk of injury
that was increased over what she would face in 
her everyday life."
s
86
Injuries sustained in an unexplained fall or as the result of an
idiopathic condition (i.e., seizure disorder, syncopal episode, etc.)
are not compensable unless there is some causal connection to the
employment that increased the risk of such an event or injuries7
resulting from the same. Increased risk can come in many forms.
A workplace with dangerous conditions may increase the
employee's risk of injury from an unexplained fall if, for instance, a
fall caused the employee to be exposed to dangerous chemicals or
machinery."" Other conditions leading to an increased risk include
89
wet or icy surfaces and stairways without railings.
Under Minnesota law, one must assume that Ole was acting in
the course of his employment while in the sex shop parking lot in
order to get to the question of whether his injury arose from his
employment under the increased risk doctrine; both elements must
be satisfied for compensability. Assuming that is the case, the
pothole is an unsafe condition which may very well have increased
Ole's risk of injury. However, potholes are a condition of everyday
84. Dykhoffv. Xcel Energy, 840 N.W.2d 821, 828-29 (Minn. 2013). Note that
there is one exception to this rule. Minnesota employs positional risk for injuries
that occur on a public street or roadway. This is known as "street risk." See Auman
v. Breckenridge Tel. Co., 188 Minn. 256, 259, 246 N.W. 889, 890 (1933).
85. Dykhoff 840 N.W.2d at 828.
86. Id. at 827.
87. Id. at 826-27.
88. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. N. Star Chems., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Minn.
1979) (holding that the death of an employee who fell into bauxite as the result of
an idiopathic condition arose out of his employment); Barlau v. Minneapolis-
Moline Power Implement Co., 214 Minn. 564, 565, 9 N.W.2d 6, 7 (1943) (holding
that the death of an employee with seizure disorder who fell into dangerous
machinery during a seizure arose out of his employment).
89. See Kirchner v. Anoka Cnty., 339 N.W.2d 908, 909 (Minn. 1983) (stairwell
without railing); Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A. F. & A. M., 226 Minn. 141,
148, 32 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1948) (icy surface).
90. Dykhoff 840 N.W.2d at 830.
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life, especially in states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin, and
therefore a strong argument could be made that Ole's employment
did not increase his risk of slipping into a pothole any more than
he was at risk for such an accident in his daily life. This is an open
question very suitable for litigation in light of the Dykhoff decision
cited above.
III. BENEFITS
A. Temporary Total Disability
1. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, when a worker has a complete wage loss during a
"healing period," the worker is eligible for temporary total disability
(TTD) benefits.91 This equals two-thirds of the worker's average
weekly wage, but it cannot exceed two-thirds of the maximum wage
rate in effect on the date of injury. 2 For example, in 2014 the
maximum weekly wage rate was $1338, with a corresponding TTD
rate of $892 per week." The TFD payable is a tax-free benefit
under the workers' compensation law.
Complete wage loss-and resulting TTD payment-occurs
when a treating practitioner indicates the worker needs to be off
work completely as a result of the work injury or when a
practitioner provides temporary physical limits that the time-of-injuy eployr . 95
injury employer cannot accommodate.
If an employee receives temporary physical limitations and
returns to work making the same or more than his average weekly
wages on the date of injury, no TTD is due during these periods.
Thus, in Wisconsin, Ole maintains entitlement to TTD through the
healing period at $879 per week from June 1 to December 31.
91. Wis. STAT. ANN § 102.43(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
"Healing period" is generally defined as "the period prior to the time when the
[work-related medical] condition becomes stationary." Knobbe v. Davis, 242 N.W.
501, 503 (Wis. 1932).
92. Wis. STAT. ANN§ 102.43(1) (Westlaw).
93. Id. §§ 102.11(1), .43(1) (Westlaw).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (a)(1) (2012).
95. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.47 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 9,
2015).
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2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, an employee is entitled to TTD benefits if:
his physical condition, in combination with his age,
training and experience, and the type of work available in
his community, causes him to be unable to secure
anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an
insubstantial income . . [and the] total disability is
temporary when it is likely [to] exist for a limited period
of time only.96
Of course, the employee must also demonstrate that he is in
the position described above because of the alleged work injury. 97
The employee will remain entitled to TTD benefits until he either
returns to work or is "released to return to work without any
physical restrictions caused by the work injury."" TTD can also be
discontinued ninety days after service of a maximum medical
improvement (MMI) opinion. 9 That period begins to run "on the
earlier of: (1) the date that the employee receives a written medical
report indicating that the employee has reached MMI; or (2) the
date that the employer or insurer serves the report on the
employee and the employee's attorney, if any."10 Additionally, TTD
can be discontinued if the employee fails to engage in a diligent
job search, 10 withdraws from the labor market, or refuses a
suitable job offer.
10 3
The employee's entitlement to TTD runs for a maximum of
130 weeks, after which it must cease. 0 4 However, if the employee is
engaged in an approved retraining plan, the TTD paid during the
retraining period does not count towards the 130 week cap, though
96. Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83, 153 N.W.2d 130,
133-34 (1967).
97. See Kautz v. Setterlin Co., 410 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Minn. 1987).
98. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subdivs. 1 (e), (h) (2014).
99. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(j). Maximum medical improvement is defined by
MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subdiv. 13(a) as "the date after which no further significant
recovery from or significant lasting improvement to a personal injury can
reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability, irrespective
and regardless of subjective complaints of pain."
100. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(j).
101. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(g).
102. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(f).
103. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(i).
104. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(k).
20151 1369
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the weeks paid before and after the retraining period do indeed
105count.
TTD is calculated as two-thirds of the employee's pre-injury
average weekly wage,'16 subject to a maximum which, at the time of
Ole's injury, was $963.90 per week.
107
Under Minnesota law, assuming he is otherwise qualified for
TTD, Ole's entitlement would cease ninety days after service of
MMI. Because two-thirds of his pre-injury average weekly wage is
$1000 (2 / 3 x $1500 = $1000), his TTD benefit would be $963.90,
the TTD maximum.
B. Permanency Benefits
1. Wisconsin
After the magic moment arrives when an injured worker
reaches a healing "plateau,"'08 a doctor may assign a percentage of
permanent disability based on the worker's functional loss. O The
employee may also return to work with no permanency, or even be
considered permanently totally disabled.0
In addition, whenever an injured employee has more than
three weeks of temporary disability, the employer or insurer must
obtain and file a final medical report from a treating practitioner
that indicates whether there is any resulting permanent partial
disability (PPD) and, if so, the extent of that resulting permanent
disability, by assigning a percentage."
In Wisconsin, an injured worker can receive compensation for
both permanent functional disability and permanent vocational
105. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. l(k); id. § 176.102, subdiv. 11(b).
106. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 1(a).
107. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. l(b)(1); see Compensation Rates as of October 1, 2014,
MINN. DEP'T LAB. & INDUS. (July 7, 2014), http://www.dli.mn.gov/wc/Pdf
/comprates_0814.pdf.
108. Larsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 101 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Wis. 1960).
109. The Commission found that it did not have to delay a PPD award for a
compensable consequence injury (back/hip from an altered gait) when the
physician assessed permanency on those body parts, even though the applicant was
still in a healing period from the original injury (ankle). Parris v. Walker Stainless
Equip., 2009 WL 2133936 (Wis. Labor & Industry Review Comm'nJune 30, 2009).
110. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
111. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD §§ 80.02(2) (e) (4), .02(2) () (West, Westlaw
through Feb. 9, 2015).
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disability (for certain types of injuries) ,2 Functional disability is
generally determined by a treating practitioner, while vocational
disability is assessed by vocational experts who understand the labor
market. Other than permanent and total disability,"
4 PPD,
whether functional or vocational, is payable at a weekly rate equal
to two-thirds of the employee's average gross weekly earnings at the
time of the injury, subject to a maximum rate. ' 5 Ole's weekly
permanency rate is the 2014 maximum, $322 per week. Except for
very low wage earners, most workers qualify for the maximum
weekly PPD rate." 6 The maximum PPD rate usually changes each
year, but the rate payable is generally fixed based upon the date of
injury." 7 The maximum PPD rate, except for very low wage earners,
is substantially less than the TTD rate.l S
When assessing permanent disability, Wisconsin varies from
many other states around the country. Twenty-two states require
the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Disability as a basis for their determination of PPD,
and six states "suggest" the use of the Guides.' 19 Wisconsin,
however, does not use the AMA Guides as a determination of the
level of PPD. 20
Rather, the functional disability assessment is left to the
discretion of a treating practitioner, with certain guidelines."'
112. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(2) codifies certain scheduled impairments (loss
of both arms, legs, or eyes) as permanent, total disability.
113. Balczewski v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 251 N.W.2d
794, 797 (Wis. 1977).
114. Permanent total disability (PTD) benefits are payable for life at the same
rate as TTD benefits. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.11 (1) (Westlaw).
115. See id. (Westlaw).
116. See id. (Westlaw).
117. See id. § 102.03(4) (Westlaw).
118. Id. § 102.11(1) (Westlaw).
119. Cf ,Impairment Guides Resource Center, LExISNEXIs LEGAL NEWSROOM
WORKERS COMPENSATION L., http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers
-compensation/b/ama-guides-impairment-ratings/archive/
2 013/07/20
/impairme n t-guides-resource-cen ter- 2800_updated-4_2f00_03_2f00_2010_2900
_.aspx (last updated Sept. 9, 2013).
120. The Commission has indicated a physician's rating of permanent
disability in Wisconsin is not made credible, however, solely by his reference to the
AMA standards. See Lang v. Consol. Papers, Inc., Claim No. 89048039, 1997 WL
614850, at *7 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Sept. 8, 1997).
121. The Department of Workforce Development's workers' compensation
pamphlet for treating practitioners indicates that "final rating will be based on the
13712015]
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Wisconsin Administrative Code chapter DWD, section 80.32
provides minimum percentages based on range of motion, sensory
loss, and certain surgical procedures. 1
22
Thus, for a C4-5 fusion, Wisconsin pays a minimum ten
percent functional permanency (ten percent of 1000 weeks, since
this is an "unscheduled" injury) with additional components for
weakness, pain, and range of motion loss. The minimum ten
percent would pay $322 per week for one-hundred weeks
($32,200), whether or not Ole returns to work.
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, an employee is entitled to PPD benefits for loss
of function or impairment of use to a part of his body.' 23 PPD is
rated as a percentage and in relation to the effect on the body as a• 24
whole. PPD cannot exceed one-hundred percent to the body as a
whole. 125
The permanency percentage is assigned per Minnesota
Administrative Rule 5223, which exhaustively covers virtually every
contemplated injury and assigns percentages accordingly.126 These
assignments require medical confirmation and may vary based
upon medical testing (e.g., for range of motion, etc.). The assigned
doctor's personal knowledge, experience and weighing of all anatomical damages
and clinical findings." See Wisconsin Workers Compensation - How to Evaluate
Permanent Disability, ST. Wis. DEP'T WORKFORCE DEV., http://dwd.wisconsin.gov
/dwd/publications/wc/WKC-7761-P.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
122. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.32(1)-(14) (West, Westlaw through
Feb. 9, 2015)
123. SeeMINN. STAT. § 176.101, subdiv. 2a (2014).
124. See id. § 176.101, subdiv. 2a(a).
125. Id.
126. See generally MiNN. R. 5223 (2014).
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percentage is then used as a multiplier against a sum certain,
provided by statute (see below) and varying by ercentage 
range. 127
The result of this equation is the payable 
PPD. 2P
Impairment Rating (percent) Amount
less than 5.5 $75,000
5.5 to less than 10.5 $80,000
10.5 to less than 15.5 $85,000
15.5 to less than 20.5 $90,000
20.5 to less than 25.5 $95,000
25.5 to less than 30.5 $100,000
30.5 to less than 35.5 $110,000
35.5 to less than 40.5 $120,000
40.5 to less than 45.5 $130,000
45.5 to less than 50.5 $140,000
50.5 to less than 55.5 $165,000
55.5 to less than 60.5 $190,000
60.5 to less than 65.5 $215,000
65.5 to less than 70.5 $240,000
70.5 to less than 75.5 $265,000
75.5 to less than 80.5 $315,000
80.5 to less than 85.5 $365,000
85.5 to less than 90.5 $415,000
90.5 to less than 95.5 $465,000
95.5 up to and including 100 $515,000
PPD is payable in a lump sum upon the employee's request,- . 129
but may otherwise be paid on a weekly basis. Also, PPD is not
payable while the employee is receiving TTD benefits.
3
127. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subdiv. 2a(a).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 2a(b).
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If not already apparent, in Minnesota PPD has no relation to
wage loss whatsoever. PPD is not intended to replace lost wages,
but rather to compensate for damage to the body.'
Under Minnesota law, Ole would most likely be entitled to a
7% rating for his cervical pain, assuming there were confirmatory
diagnostic tests,'3 3 plus an additional 2.5% added directly thereto
because he underwent a single-level fiision procedure. 4 It should
be noted that this could increase if Ole had any radicular
symptoms. 5 With a 9.5% rating, Ole would be entitled to $7600 in
PPD benefits (0.095 x $80,000 = $7600).
C. Vocational Rehabilitation
1. Wisconsin
A main focus of the workers' compensation system in
Wisconsin is to restore the earning capacity that a worker held
before suffering a work injury. As a public policy, the hope is that
an injured worker-after reaching their healing plateau-can
return to their time-of-injury employer, making similar wages. A
return to work, however, is not always possible, based on the
worker's level of disability, the former employer's decisions, or a
variety of other factors. In these situations, vocational retraining
becomes an option.
Specifically, an injured worker who has permanent doctor's
restrictions, which preclude a return to work for the former
employer, may be eligible for vocational retraining benefits under
the Wisconsin workers' compensation law. Allowing an injured
worker the option to be retrained in a new field or profession
fulfills one of the goals of the workers' compensation system:
restoring the injured worker's pre-injury earning capacity. Indeed,
the Wisconsin Administrative Code states that "[t]he primary
purpose of vocational rehabilitation benefits is to provide a method
to restore an injured worker as nearly as possible to the worker's
preinjury earning capacity and potential."
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Moes v. City of St. Paul, 402 N.W.2d 520 (Minn. 1987).
132. See id. at 526.
133. MINN. R. 5223.0370, subpart 3(C)(1) (2014).
134. Id. R. 5223.0370, Subpart 5(A).
135. Id. R. 5223.0370, subpart 4.
136. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.49(1) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 9,
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To fulfill this purpose, the Wisconsin workers' compensation
law works in conjunction with the Federal Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the state agency that administers that Act, the Wisconsin
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) .1
7 Title I of the
Rehabilitation Act was designed to provide vocational rehabilitation
services for individuals with disabilities, regardless of whether the
disability was work related or not.""
In Wisconsin, the DVR administers the Act and provides
vocational rehabilitation services for eligible individuals with
disabilities (known to the DVR as "consumers").
1 3
' The DVR's
purpose is to "work in partnership with consumers to individually
pursue, obtain and maintain employment suited to their abilities
and interests and leading to independence, increased self-
sufficiency and full inclusion in 
society. ' 1
4 °
An employee who received workers' compensation and is
unable to return to work for his time-of-injury employer can pursue
vocational retraining benefits. 4' If the DVR finds the injured
worker eligible for retraining benefits and establishes an academic
retraining plan (e.g., a return to school), the insurance carrier is
responsible for weekly maintenance benefits (at two-thirds of the
employee's average weekly earnings), as well as travel and meal
expenses during school, and tuition and book expenses.
142 The
workers' compensation system also allows an injured worker to
pursue an academic retraining program through a private
2015).
137. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.61(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3); see also
DEP'T OF WORKFORCE DEV., VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM POLICY AUGUST
OF 2014, at iii (2014) [hereinafter VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM], available
at http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dvr/policy/vr _programpolicy.pdf.
138. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (2012). The purpose of Title I of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is to provide:
comprehensive, coordinated, effective, efficient, and accountable
programs of vocational rehabilitation, each of which is .. .designed to
assess, plan, develop, and provide vocational rehabilitation services for
individuals with disabilities, consistent with their strengths, resources,
priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, informed choice,
and economic self-sufficiency, so that such individuals may prepare for
and engage in gainful employment.
Id. § 720(a) (2).
139. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM, supra note 137, at iii.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Wis. STAT. ANN. §102.61(1) (Westlaw).
142. Id. §§ 102.61(1), (1)(g)(b), (1)(m)(d), (1)(r)(c) (Westlaw).
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vocational counselor if the DVR does not have immediate funding
to provide services to the worker.
143
Retraining programs established through the DVR are entitled
to a great amount of deference by the Worker's Compensation
Department.14 ALJs and the Commission can overturn a DVR
counselor's proposed academic retraining plan only on limited
grounds, thus providing few defenses to insurance carriers. 145 The
presumption in favor of the DVR program only applies to the first
eighty weeks of benefits, although programs longer than eighty
weeks can be awarded if warranted by the Department.' 6
The option of vocational retraining takes on added
significance depending on whether an injured worker suffered a
scheduled or unscheduled injury. If an injured worker with
permanent restrictions from a scheduled injury (e.g., injuries to
extremities, limbs, vision, or hearing) cannot return to work for the
time-of-injury employer (making eighty-five percent of pre-injury
wages), the worker's only vocational benefits under the law are
retraining benefits. 141 However, if an injured worker with
permanent restrictions from an unscheduled injury (e.g., back,
neck, head, or mental injuries) cannot return to the time-of-injury
employer (earning eighty-five percent of pre-injury wages), the
worker can pursue vocational retraining benefits and loss of-- 148
earning capacity benefits.
Loss of earning capacity benefits are available only for workers
who suffered unscheduled injuries. Therefore, if retraining does
not occur or it is not possible for an injured worker with an
unscheduled injury (such as Ole's injury to his neck), that
employee has another option: pursuing loss of earning capacity
benefits, which generally are more significant (i.e., greater
monetary compensation) than retraining benefits. "
49
143. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.49(2) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 9,
2015).
144. Cf DaimlerChrysler v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2007 WI 15,
1 14-21, 299 Wis. 2d 1,727 N.W.2d 311.
145. Mass. Bonding v. Indus. Comm'n, 82 N.W.2d 191 (Wis. 1957)
146. Retraining beyond eighty weeks may not be authorized "if the primary
purpose of further training is to improve upon preinjury earning capacity rather
than restoring it." WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.49(3) (Westlaw).
147. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.52 (Westlaw).
148. Id. § 102.44(3) (Westlaw).
149. Id. § 102.44(3) (Westlaw).
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On the contrary, if an employee with a scheduled injury
cannot return to his former profession, the employee's only
vocational recourse under the workers' compensation law is a
retraining program. If retraining for that individual is not viable,
there are no further vocational benefits (including loss of earning
capacity benefits). The significance of this is seen in the example of
a high-wage earning trucker who suffers a hand injury that
precludes a return to his former profession (i.e., inability to use a
stick shift). If the trucker cannot be retrained (because of past
education, age, or other factors), he has no further vocational
benefits available-a legal concept that comes as quite a shock to
the injured worker who can no longer perform his formerjob.
Thus, in Wisconsin, Ole may benefit from vocational
retraining if the DVR counselor deems him eligible for benefits
and establishes an Individual Plan for Employment that includes
GED training as a prerequisite to other degrees that may restore his
earning capacity. For every week he is in school, the insurer is liable
for weekly maintenance TTD of $879 per week, plus meals,
mileage, and tuition book expenses. His age and lack of education
may preclude him, however, from such a program. Because his
injury is unscheduled, loss of earning capacity benefits are available
as well.
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, vocational rehabilitation benefits are intended
to assist the employee to "return to ajob related to the employee's
former employment or to a job in another work area which
produces an economic status as close as possible to that the
employee would have enjoyed without disability.', 1
50 Restoration of
pre-injury economic status is the hallmark and guiding principle of
Minnesota workers' compensation law. 51 Rehabilitation that places
the employee in a position to achieve an economic status greater
than that which he held prior to the injury is permissible if
"necessary to increase the likelihood of reemployment.
' ' 15
1
In order to be entitled to rehabilitation benefits, the employee
must be qualified. A qualified employee is one who, because of the
work injury and its effects:
150. MiNN. STAT. § 176.102, subdiv. 1 (b) (2014).
151. See id.
152. Id.
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[(1)] is permanently precluded or is likely to be
permanently precluded from engaging in the employee's
usual and customary occupation or from engaging in the
job the employee held at the time of injury; [(2)] cannot
reasonably be expected to return to suitable gainful
employment with the date-of-injury employer; and [(3)]
can reasonably be expected to return to suitable gainful
employment through the provision of rehabilitation
services, considering the treating physician's opinion of
the employee's work ability.153
This determination is usually made by a qualified
rehabilitation consultant (QRC), a "professionally trained" and
registered individual,1 54 during a rehabilitation consultation
between the QRC and the employee.'55
The employer and insurer can, and often do, dispute the
employee's "qualified" status, which is ultimately a matter subject to
litigation. Assuming the employee is eventually adjudicated to be
"qualified," the QRC will develop a rehabilitation plan, which will
detail the necessary rehabilitation services, dates for initiating said
services, and expected duration of said services. 56 Again, there are
opportunities for litigation regarding the proposed plan. 157
Assuming the rehabilitation plan is agreed to and/or approved one
way or another, the employee then proceeds with rehabilitation
according to the plan, subject to modification along the way.151
Services rendered during this time may include, but are not limited
to, medical management, counseling, professional guidance, job
analysis, modification of prior job to accommodate work
restrictions, job placement services, development of transferrable
job skills, job training, and vocational testing.1 59 Along the way, the
QRC must provide periodic reports on the employee's progress.""
Benefits end and the plan is closed when the employee completes
the rehabilitation plan, is working at suitable employment for thirty
days or more, settles his case on terms which foreclose ongoing
153. MiNN. R. 5220.0100, subpart 22 (2014) (emphasis added).
154. Id. R. 5220.0100, subpart 23.
155. Id. R. 5220.0100, subpart 26.
156. Id. R. 5220.0410, subpart 1.
157. See, e.g., id. R. 5220.01410, subpart 4.
158. See id. R. 5220.0510.
159. See id. R. 5220.0100.
160. Id. R. 5220.0450, subpart 3.
1378 [Vol. 41:4
29
Domer and Johnson: A Comparison of Wisconsin and Minnesota Workers' Compensation Cla
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
A WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMPARISON
rehabilitation benefits, dies, or the employer and insurer
successfully move for closure, among other reasons.'
6' During the
period of vocational rehabilitation, the employee is entitled to
continue receiving TTD or temporary partial disability (TPD)
benefits. 62
Retraining is a separate benefit from vocational rehabilitation
and constitutes "a formal course of study in a school setting which
is designed to train an employee to return to suitable gainful
employment.',161 It is available only when it will materially assist the
employee in returning to his prior economic status by restoring his
lost earning capacity."A Generally, an employee's entitlement to
retraining is assessed according to the following factors:
(1) the reasonableness of retraining as compared to
returning to work with employer or other job placement
activities, (2) the likelihood that employee has the ability
and interest to succeed in a formal course of study in a
school, (3) whether retraining is likely to result in
reasonably attainable employment, and (4) whether
retraining is likely to produce an economic status as close
as possible to that which the employee would have
enjoyed without disability."'
Employers and insurers virtually always defend retraining
claims. The benefits available in a retraining plan include: (1) up
to 156 weeks of retraining indemnity benefits (paid at the same rate
as TTD or TPD) ;166 (2) the "reasonable cost of tuition, books, travel,
custodial day care; and . . . board and lodging when [retraining]
requires residence away from the employee's customary
residence"; 167 (3) the "reasonable costs of travel and custodial day
care during the job interview process";'
68 and (4) the "reasonable
161. Id. R. 5220.0510, subparts 5-7a.
162. TTD benefits are payable when the employee is unable to work at all;
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits are payable when the employee has
returned to work, but at a gross weekly wage that is lower than his gross weekly
wage prior to the injury (i.e., when the employee is working at a wage loss).
163. MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subdiv. 17a (2014).
164. Norby v. Arctic Enters., Inc., 305 Minn. 519, 521, 232 N.W.2d 773, 775
(1975).
165. Poole v. Farmstead Foods, Inc., 42 W.C.D. 970, 978 (Minn. WCCA 1989).
166. See MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subdiv. 11 (a).
167. Id. § 176.102, subdiv. 9(a) (3).
168. Id. § 176.102, subdiv. 9(a) (4).
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cost for moving expenses of the employee and family if a job is
found in a geographic area beyond reasonable commuting
distance" (after a diligent search demonstrates no such job or
similarjob within the present community is available).19
Under Minnesota law, Ole would almost assuredly be deemed
a "qualified" employee due to his permanent work restrictions and
because he cannot return to his work as a truck driver. He would
therefore be entitled to rehabilitation benefits according to a
rehabilitation plan, with the goal of returning him to his prior
economic position.
D. Loss of Earning Capacity Benefits
1. Wisconsin
Since the Ole matter is an unscheduled injury, if the worker
cannot complete school or is unable to go to school, a private
vocational counselor determines a loss of earning capacity as a
percentage of PPD (subsuming the ten percent for the functional
PPD). 170 The doctor must establish permanent restrictions that
preclude a return to work as a prerequisite to PPD (as in Ole's
case) .171
For workers with non-scheduled injuries in Wisconsin, a loss of
earning capacity claim is available if they cannot return to work for
their employer at eighty-five percent of former wages.17 The loss of
earning capacity is routinely established by testimony from a
173vocational expert.
The expert compares the effect of the impairment on the
employee's wage earning capacity with the employee's permanent
and total disability for occupational purposes, taking into account
age, education, work history, vocational training and other factors
listed in chapter DWD, section 80.34.174 This loss of earning
169. Id. § 176.102,subdiv. 9(a)(5).
170. Balczewski v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 251 N.W.2d
794, 797 (Wis. 1977).
171. Id.
172. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(6) (a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
173. See Vocational Expert Report, DEP'T WORKFORCE DEV., http://dwd.wisconsin
.gov/dwd/fonns/wkc/pdf/wkc_6743.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2015); see also
Balczewski, 251 N.W.2d at 797.
174. See WiS. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.34 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 9,
2015).
1380 [Vol. 41:4
31
Domer and Johnson: A Comparison of Wisconsin and Minnesota Workers' Compensation Cla
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
A WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMPARISON
capacity is calculated as a percentage and applied to 1000 weeks,
then paid at the PPD rate.'"'
The percentage of PPD assigned for loss of earning capacity is
not added to the functional physical PPD; rather, the worker is
entitled to the greater of the two. The lower assessment
essentially is subsumed as part of the larger assessment. For
example, an employee with a ten percent functional PPD to the
back would be entitled to one-hundred weeks of PPD for the
functional loss. Permanent restrictions from the doctor, however,
may preclude his return to work for the employer and result in a
claim for a loss of earning capacity at forty percent (four-hundred
weeks of PPD). In this scenario, the injured worker does not receive
the one-hundred weeks for the functional loss, plus the four-
hundred weeks for the vocational loss. The total PPD entitlement is
the greater of the two assessments, or in this case, four-hundred
weeks."'
Given Ole's lack of education and absence of transferrable
skills, his loss of earning capacity in Wisconsin would be significant.
2. Minnesota
Minnesota has no claim for loss of earning capacity. Further,
Minnesota has a 130-week cap on TTD benefits and a separate cap
on TPD benefits, which are intended to compensate the employee
who returns to work, but at a wage loss. The TPD cap is either 225
weeks or 450 weeks of payments after the date of injury, whichever
occurs sooner. However, time spent in a retraining program does
not count towards either the TTD or TPD caps (i.e., the time in
175. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(3) (Westlaw); see also id. § 102.11(1) (Westlaw).
176. The 1000-week "body as a whole" permanency listed in section 102.44(3)
of Wisconsin Statutes is the basis for both the doctor's functional loss percentage
and the vocational expert's loss of earning capacity.
177. See Lani Fay v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 2000-028695, 2004 WL 2031442, at
*4 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Aug. 31, 2004). The Commission refers
to the "standard practice" of combining the "'functional' rating into the rating for
loss of earning capacity to reach a single permanent partial disability award." Id.
The Commission further notes that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized
that in such cases of unscheduled disability, "there is one award for permanent
partial disability based on a consideration of both the functional loss and the loss
of earning capacity." id. (footnote omitted). These considerations are "generally
accomplished by determining the effect of the permanent work restrictions from
the injury on the applicant's future earning capacity, rather than basing the award
purely on the functional loss." Id.
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retraining suspends the running of the caps until retraining is
complete).
E. Disfigurement Benefits
1. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, Ole's disfigurement would be payable for the
discriminatory effects on future employment up to a maximum of
$66,900."' The term "disfigurement" is not defined in the statute.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated "that the plain meaning
of disfigurement encompasses an impairment that significantly
affects the appearance of a person."179
Under Wisconsin law, consideration for disfigurement
allowance is confined to those areas of the body that are exposed in
the "normal course of employment." Examples include the face,
neck, hands, arms, and legs. Gender issues do apply in assessing
what parts of the body are visible at work."' A scar's ability to be
hidden is only one factor; it does not preclude an award.'s8
178. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.56(1) (Westlaw).
179. Cnty. of Dane v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2009 WI 9, 25, 315
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571.
180. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.56(1) (Westlaw).
181. The reported cases routinely involve "normally exposed" areas of the
body, but not exclusively. See, e.g., Evans Bros. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing for compensation where
a chest scar was exposed on a construction worker).
182. For instance, a woman's leg scar may be exposed in normal employment
while a male's leg scar is more likely to be covered by pants.
183. See Thompson v. Thompson Roofing, No. 85003642, 1997 WL 100933, at
*2, *6 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Feb. 28, 1997) (crediting applicant's
testimony that wearing shorts frequently as a roofing estimator was routine where
employer argued that the worker could wear long pants to hide the scar); see also
Blaise v. Berliner & Marx, No. 90024198, 1993 WL 441417, at *1 (Wis. Labor &
Indus. Review Comm'n Oct. 6, 1993) ("The commission realizes that applicant's
scar may be hidden if he wears a long sleeve shirt. However, the commission does
not believe that occupations for which the applicant is suited are ones that, in the
most part and for the majority of time, utilize long sleeves unless applicant chose
to wear such long sleeves simply to cover his scar. The commission has considered
the fact that long sleeves will cover the applicant's scar but, again, it is only one
factor in the commission's review of this case.").
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Scars are not the only compensable claims. For instance, facial
tics, missing teeth, torticollis (head leaning to one side), a claw
hand, and a hand tremor may also be compensated. 
1
4
Obviously, the extent of the disfigurement affects the size of
the award. The maximum recovery is equal to the employee's
average annual earnings, subject to the State's maximum wage
rate. Under Wisconsin Statutes section 102.11(2), the average
annual earnings are fifty times the average weekly wage, unless the
actual earnings in the fifty-two weeks before the 
injury are higher.
18 6
Under Wisconsin Statutes section 102.56, the disfigurement
award can either be the statutory maximum or a lesser amount
determined by a host of enumerated statutory factors including the
employee's age, work history, and occupation, as well as the scar's
appearance, location, and visibility."8 A significant amount of
subjectivity exists in weighing these factors and making a
disfigurement award. According to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,
section 102.56 "affords the department substantial leeway in
calculating a sum to compensate workers who most likely will never
know the full extent to which their disfigurements reduced their
wages."lS
2. Minnesota
Minnesota has no specific benefit for disfigurement. Rather,
cosmetic disfigurement to only the face, head, neck, or dorsum of
the hands is compensable as a form of PPD.' s9 As with other forms
of PPD, the percentage is assigned by rule. l Jo Also, PPD is not
assigned until twenty-four months after the injury and also after any
plastic surgery is performed. 19'
184. See, e.g., Mannery v. Nat'l Abatement Co., No. 91066166, 1994 WL
680379, at *2-3 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 1996) (sustaining
the ALj's finding of fifteen percent permanent total disability for the worker's
injured wrist that had a tremor and could not be fully extended).
185. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.11 (Westlaw).
186. Id. § 102.11(2); Blaise v. Berliner & Marx, No. 90024198, 1993 WL
441417, at *3 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Oct. 6,1993).
187. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.56 (Westlaw).
188. Eaton Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 364 N.W.2d 172, 174
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added).
189. MINN. R. 5223.0650, subpart 1 (2014); id. R. 5223.0010.
190. Id. R. 5223.0650, subparts 2-6.
191. Id. R. 5223.0650, subpart 1.
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Ole has a scar on his forehead. Assuming that this remains
more than twenty-four months after his injury, he would be entitled
to a PPD percentage of anywhere from zero to four percent,
depending on the length of the scar.' 92 This would amount to
anywhere between $0 to $3000 in PPD (0% x $75,000 = $0; 0.04%
x $75,000 = $3000). This could increase if the scar is
hypertrophic. '9
F. Permanent Total Disability
1. Wisconsin
In general, a Wisconsin injured worker may be deemed
permanently and totally disabled through two routes: (1) complete
physical incapacity-defined medically or statutorily; or (2)
vocational permanent and total disability.'91 If an employee is found
to be permanently and totally disabled, Wisconsin law provides
weekly indemnity benefits (at two-thirds of the average weekly
wage), along with reasonable and necessary medical expenses, for
the employee's lifetime. 195 The length and amount of payments often
result in a considerable value to the applicant and corresponding
exposure for an insurance carrier-generating substantial litigation
of PTD claims in Wisconsin. Additionally, for employees found
permanently totally disabled, a death benefit is available to
dependents upon the employee's death, even if the death is not
proximately related to the injury. l 6
PTD claims generally are applicable for only "unscheduled"
work injuries.'97 Based on the type of proof submitted, an employee
can be deemed permanently totally disabled from either a medical
perspective or a vocational perspective. Regarding physical
incapacity, the severity of an employee's unscheduled work injuries
may render the employee physically incapable of engaging in any
192. Id. R. 5223.0650, subpart 2(F) (4) (a)-(c).
193. Id. R. 5223.0650, subpart 2 (F) (4) (d).
194. Balczewski v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 251 N.W. 2d
794, 797 (Wis. 1977).
195. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
Note, for certain dates of injuries, supplemental benefit amounts are available for
permanently totally disabled workers. Id. § 101.44(1) (Westlaw).
196. See id. §§ 102.44(3), .46 (Westlaw).
197. Spine, torso, or head injuries are not specified in Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.52 (Westlaw).
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further employment. This occurs when the employee's treating
physician indicates that the employee is unable 
to work. 198
While doctors are not necessarily experts in the labor market,
they can opine about an employee's physical incapacity and make
recommendations to not return to any employment. Respondent
attorneys often argue that such "vocational" opinions should be left
to vocational experts and that "medical permanent total disability"
opinions by physicians stray from their area of expertise.' 9 Decision
makers generally view such an opinion by a physician with
skepticism.20 Accordingly, claimants facing these situations are well-
advised to obtain vocational reports, even in the face of a physician
providing a medical PTD assessment.
Alternatively, an employee can be permanently and totally
disabled vocationally.201 For unscheduled injuries, vocational
disability is determined by assessing an employee's loss of earning
capacity.
When an employee suffers a near-complete loss of earning
capacity, the "odd lot" doctrine may play a role.2°' The best
introduction to the "odd lot" doctrine is through the example of an
applicant named Lonnie Smith.20 3 Mr. Smith "worked virtually all
his adult life" as a heavy laborer, primarily sorting, handling, and
204
transporting scrap metal . He had no secondary education, and
198. An example is when a physician indicates that the injured worker is
'unable to perform any work," or "permanently and totally precluded from gainful
employment" on the Department's prescribed WKC 16 b report (otherwise known
as a Practioner's Report in Lieu of Testimony) pursuant to Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.17(1) (d) (Westlaw).
199. Kurschner v. Industrial Commission, 161 N.W.2d 213 (Wis. 1968), ushered
in the concept of vocational testimony supplanting medical testimony on loss of
earning capacity.
200. See, e.g., Harris v. Am. Motors Corp., No. 88-27583, 1990 WL 483292, at *3
(Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Nov. 29, 1990).
201. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.44(3), .11 (1) (Westlaw); Wis. ADMrN. CODE ch.
DWD, § 80.34 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 9, 2015).
202. Cargill Feed Div. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2010 WI App 115,
1, 329 Wis. 2d 206, 789 N.W.2d 326 ("Under the odd-lot doctrine, injured
workers may be classified permanently and totally disabled even if they retain a
small, residual capacity to earn income; if they are 'fit only for the odd lotjob that
appears occasionally and for a short time."' (quoting Beecher v. Labor & Indus.
Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 88, 2, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29)).
203. Lonnie Smith v. Milwaukee Scrap Metal Co., No. 1996012444, 1998 WL
1006264 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Feb. 25, 1999).
204. Id. at *2.
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he was functionally illiterate. 205 At the age of sixty-two, he suffered a
20rwork-related back injury that drastically altered his work abilities. "'
He could not lift more than twenty pounds, had to avoid repetitive
motions, and frequently had to change positions. 20' Essentially, he
could no longer engage in the only type of work he knew-heavy
2081physical labor.
Based on his injury, Smith filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits, where he was found to be permanently and
totally disabled.2 9 Such a determination raises questions. Smith's
back injury, while significant, did not render him completely
incapacitated or physically helpless,2 0 so how was he deemed
permanently and totally disabled?
The answer lies in the nuances and ambiguities of the "odd
lot" doctrine in Wisconsin. The "odd lot" doctrine is one of the
crowning achievements of the Wisconsin workers' compensation
law. This inexact doctrine applies when "[a]n employee ... is so
injured that he can perform no services other than those which are
so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably
stable market for them does not exist."
21 1
The "odd lot" doctrine serves primarily as a rule of evidence.
The applicant initially must show that the combination of certain
basic facts-the applicant's injury, age, education, capacity, and
training-demonstrate an inability to secure any continuing and
gainful employment.1 2
After a prima facie case is made, the respondent bears the
burden of proving (through nonmedical vocational expert
testimony, opinion, or labor market survey) "that the injured
employee is actually employable and that there are actual jobs
available to him., 213 If such proof is not provided in rebuttal, the
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (noting limited employment possibilities).
211. Balczewski v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 251 N.W.2d
794, 797 (Wis. 1977).
212. Beecher v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 88, 273 Wis. 2d 136,
682 N.W.2d 29; Balczewski, 251 N.W.2d at 797.
213. Beecher, 2004 WI 88, 44, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29 (emphasis
added). Generally, a labor market survey is needed to identify specific and
currently available jobs within the applicant's permanent physical restrictions.
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applicant technically prevails. 2 " Alternatively, if the respondent
satisfies its burden, the decision maker then faces the actual "odd-
lot" determination: whether the injured worker-based on
pertinent characteristics-can only perform those jobs which are so
limited in quality, dependability, and quantity "that a reasonably
stable market for them does not exist.,
2
B
The substantial social and economic support provided to
injured workers by these rules is undisputed. The doctrine assists
those injured workers who-while not physically helpless or
incapable of work-cannot secure any continuing, consistent, or
gainful employment based on their relevant characteristics and
work limitations. As such, the "odd lot" doctrine is "an exception to
the general rule that a permanently, totally disabled employee has
no future earning capacity." '21 The doctrine "fills the gaps" and
attempts to adequately compensate these individuals-so that such
a worker is not left to the sometimes harsh realities (and potential
discriminations) of the labor market. Moreover, when compared to
the benefit levels for even a high-end loss of earning capacity
assessment, a finding of "odd lot" PTD results in a substantial
211
economic benefit for the injured worker.
In Wisconsin, should a vocational expert find Ole permanently
totally disabled under the "odd lot" doctrine, he would be paid
$892 per week during his lifetime, with no cut-off at a presumed
218
retirement age. With a life expectancy of thirty years or so, hisindemnity claim is worth well over a million dollars.
2. Minnesota
Minnesota has two forms of PTD. The first type of PTD relates
to those employees who have sustained catastrophic injuries,
214. See, e.g., Novotney v. Dep't Health & Family Servs., Nos. 2004-014156,
2004-011038, 2007 WL 2051499 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n June 25,
2007); Grimm v. Metz Banking Co., No. 2000-032233, 2004 WL 1772179 (Wis.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Feb. 14, 2007); Lane v. Rest. Depot, No. 2000-
059628, 2005 WL 1658467 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n June 28, 2005);
Potter v. Productive Living Sys., No. 1997-049136, 2005 WL 1123223 (Wis. Labor &
Indus. Review Comm'n Apr. 27, 2005).
215. Balczewski, 251 N.W.2d at 797.
216. Beecher, 2004 WI 88, 51, 273 Wis. 2d 136, 682 N.W.2d 29.
217. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.43(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3)
(providing for "two-thirds of the average weekly earning during such disability").
218. Id.
138720151
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namely the "total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the
loss of both arms at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to
the hips that no effective artificial members can be used, complete
and permanent paralysis, [or] total and permanent loss of mental
faculties."29 The second type of PTD takes account of both medical
and vocational characteristics of the employee. This is a two-step
process. First, the employee must demonstrate that he meets any of
the following three criteria:
(i) [he] has at least a 17 percent permanent partial
disability rating of the whole body; (ii) [he] has a
permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at
least 15 percent and [he was] at least 50 years old at the
time of injury; or (iii) [he] has a permanent partial
disability rating of the whole body of at least 13 percent
and [he] is at least 55 years old at the time of the injury,
and has not completed grade 12 or obtained a GED
certificate.220
Second, the employee must demonstrate that this condition,
when considered alongside his "age, education, training and
experience," renders him "unable to secure anything more than
sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income"-the
consideration of age, education, training, and experience cannot
be addressed until the employee satisfies the first set of thresholds
221(i-iii above).
Generally, this second type of PTD is more complicated and
more often the subject of litigation. Defenses to PTD claims run
the gamut from allegations that the employee has not performed a
diligent (failed) job search or otherwise demonstrated that he• • 222
cannot attain suitable regular employment to the employee's
withdrawal from the labor market. Another defense arises when
the employee is actually working despite the PTD claim. In order to
counter such a defense, the employee needs to show that his
earnings from said employment are insubstantial and/or that the
224employment is sporadic.
219. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subdiv. 5(1) (2014).
220. Id. § 176.101, subdivs. 5(2)(i)-(iii).
221. Id. § 176.101, subdiv. 5.
222. See, e.g., Hanmer v. Wes Barrette Masonry, 403 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn.
1987).
223. See Paine v. Beek's Pizza, 323 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Minn. 1982).
224. See, e.g., Panitzke v. Homette Corp., 2001 WL 900664, at *6-7 (Minn.
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Retirement is perhaps the best defense to a PTD claim under
Minnesota law. By law, PTD benefits must stop when the employee
reaches the age of sixty-seven because the employee is presumed
225
under the law to have retired as of that date. The employee may
rebut this presumption, but a simple subjective offering that the
employee "is not retired" will be insufficient to successfully rebut;
226
more is required. Successfully rebutting the retirement
presumption often falls upon witness testimony (such as from the
employee's spouse or co-workers) that the employee said (before
his in 2ry) that he intended to work beyond the age of sixty-
seven. The testimony of the employee regarding his own
intentions is helpful as well and ma, in some cases be enough to
rebut the retirement presumption. The following are additional
factors which may aid the court in determining whether the
employee has removed himself from the labor market via
retirement: (1) the employee's expressed intent to retire or
continue working; (2) an application for social security, retirement,
or disability; (3) evidence of a financial need for employment
income, including the adequacy of a pension or other retirement;
(4) whether the employee or the employer initiated the discussion
of retirement; (5) whether the employee sought rehabilitation
assistance; and (6) whether the employee actively sought
229
alternative employment or was in fact working.
In Ole's case, the catastrophic-injury type of PTD is
inapplicable; he did not lose the described body parts and there is
also no indication that he has lost his mental faculties. Under the
medical/vocational form of PTD, he has not sustained 17% PPD or
15% PPD, so the first two qualifying criteria are foreclosed. On the
other hand, he was at least fifty-five years old at the time of the
injury, has not completed grade twelve, and does not have a GED.
Therefore, if he can demonstrate at least 13% PPD, he can move
on to considerations of his age, education, training, and so forth.
WCCAJuly9, 2001).
225. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subdiv. 4.
226. Id.
227. See Hurd v. N. Indus. Insulation, No. WC08-190, 2009 WL 1103620, at *8
(Minn. WCCA Apr. 10, 2009).
228. Skari v. Aero Sys. Eng'g, No. WC11-5257, 2011 WL 6004433, at *3 (Minn.
WCCA Nov. 7, 2011).
229. See Hanegmon v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. WC06-111, 2006 WL 2462104, at
*3-6 (Minn. WCCA Aug. 10, 2006).
13892015]
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This will be difficult. As was previously noted, Ole would be entitled
to 9.5% PPD for the back and 0%-4% for the scar, but total PPD is
not calculated by simply adding all ratings together (i.e., by adding
9.5% to 0%-4% to get 9.5%-13.5%). Rather, a different formula isS 230
employed, which in this case nets a total PPD to the body as a
whole of 9.5% to 13.12%. Therefore, Ole must show that he is
entitled to the maximum PPD possible. Assuming he can, and
exceeds the 13%, Ole's age, education, training, etc. would be
considered to determine PTD.
If entitled to PTD benefits, Ole would receive $963.90 per
week (the PTD maximum) and be entitled to receive the same
until reaching age sixty-seven, at which point he would need to
rebut the statutory retirement presumption. Also, Ole's benefits
would be subject to cost-of-living adjustments beginning on the
231third anniversary of his date of injury (June 1, 2017). Ole's PTD
claim has a present value of over $380,000. 232
G. Social Security/Workers' Compensation Offset
1. Wisconsin
An injured worker's receipt of Social Security Disability (SSD)
Benefits can produce an offset from workers' compensation
payments for TTD, PPD, and PTD. 233 There is no social security
231offset against vocational retraining benefits.
A workers' compensation recipient who is also collecting SSD
cannot net, in combined benefits, more than eighty percent of his
average current earnings (ACE) 235 Wisconsin is one of sixteen
"Reverse Offset" states, whereby any offset is taken on workers'
230. MINN. STAT. § 176.105, subdiv. 4(f); MINN. R. 5223.0010, subpart 2
(2014).
231. MINN. STAT. § 176.645, subdiv. 2.
232. This present value was calculated using the Workers' Compensation
Reinsurance Association (WCRA) Present Value Calculator and employed a five
percent discount rate and a one percent escalation rate. See Present Value Calculator,
WCRA, http://www.wcra.biz/calculators/PresentValueCalc.aspx (last visited Apr.
23, 2015).
233. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 3).
234. Id. § 102.44(5) (g) (Westlaw).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) (2012).
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236
compensation benefits rather than Social Security benefits.
Under Wisconsin Statutes section 102.44(5) (a):
For each dollar that the total monthly [workers'
compensation] benefits. . . , excluding attorney's fees and
costs, plus the monthly benefits payable under the social
security act for disability exceed 80% of the employee's
average current earnings as determined by the social
security administration, the [workers' compensation]
benefits.., shall be reduced by the same amount so that
the total benefits payable shall not exceed 80% of the
237
[worker's ACE] .
The offset ends at SSD regular retirement age, now sixty-five,
sixty-six, or sixty-seven.
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, once the employer and insurer have paid
$25,000 in PTD benefits, they are entitled to a dollar-for-dollar
offset for: (1) any government disability benefits paid to the
employee if said benefits are the result of the work injury; (2)
government old age benefits (i.e., Social Security retirement
benefits); and (3) government survivor insurance benefits (i.e.,
Social Security survivor benefits).238 There is no cap or restriction
on this offset-it can theoretically completely eliminate the PTD
236. Most other states provide that under federal law the Social Security
Administration is entitled to a credit against any workers' compensation benefits
that a Social Security Disability claimant receives. See 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.401(a) (2014); see also SSR 87-21C, 1987 WL 109206 (Jan. 1, 1987); SSR 81-
32, 1981 WL 27310 (Jan. 1, 1981); SSR 81-20, 1981 WL 27309 (Jan. 1, 1981).
Under Social Security law, Social Security is required to reduce or offset the level
of a recipient's Social Security Disability payments when a total of the recipient's
disability payments and workers' compensation benefits exceed eighty percent of
his average current earnings, a figure that is arrived at by taking one-twelfth of the
claimant's highest year of wages and self-employment income in the calendar year
of the disability onset date or any of five preceding years. 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a). The
reduction is taken against the recipient's monthly Social Security benefits. Id. In
Wisconsin, however, the reverse is true. The eighty percent ACE formula is used,
but the workers' compensation insurance carrier liability is reduced, not that of
Social Security.
237. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.44(5) (a) (Westlaw).
238. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subdiv. 4 (2014).
13912015]
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liability for the employer and insurer if the offset exceeds the PTD
payable. 239 It is thus very beneficial to employers and insurers.
H. Attorney's Fees
1. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, attorney's fees on PTD claims are capped at
twenty percent, with one further limitation: attorney's fees are not
allowed on PTD claims beyond five-hundred weeks.2 1 0 The five-
hundred week "clock" starts at the end of healing date (i.e., when
the claim for PTD benefits generally begins).
Attorney's fees are not applicable to medical expenses, nor to
any part of a settlement allocated for future medical expenses.141 If
Ole's case settled in Wisconsin, fees on PTD benefits would be
limited to $89,200 (0.20 x 500 weeks at $892 per week).
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota, attorney's fees are awarded at twenty percent of
242
the employee's recovery, subject to a maximum of $26,000. This
is presumed by statute to be an adequate amount of attorney's
fees. 21' However, a variety of cases decided in Minnesota have
allowed an employee's attorney to move for fees in excess of the
244twenty percent called for by statute. These include Roraff fees and
245
Heaton fees (named after the cases which spawned them). These
cases require the petitioning attorney to show that the statutory fee
(i.e., twenty percent of the compensation awarded to the
employee) would inadequately compensate him, considering the
factors involved in the employee's case, including "the amount
involved, the time and expense necessary to prepare for trial, the
responsibility assumed by counsel, the experience of counsel, the
239. See id.
240. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. DWD, § 80.43(3) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 9,
2015).
241. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.30 (7) (Westlaw); Wis. ADMIN CODE ch. DWD,
§ 80.43(2) (Westlaw).
242. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subdiv. 1.
243. Id. § 176.081, subdiv. 1(1).
244. See, e.g., Roraff v. State, Dep't of Transp., 288 N.W.2d 15, 16 (Minn.
1980); Heaton v.J.E. Fryer & Co., 36 W.C.D. 316, 319 (Minn. WCCA 1983).
245. See Roraff 288 N.W.2d at 16; Heaton, 36 W.C.D. at 319.
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difficulties of the issues, the nature of the proof involved, and the
results obtained. 246 These claims are vigorously litigated in
Minnesota. Under Minnesota law, the attorney retained by Ole
would be entitled to twenty percent of his awarded compensation
and, if Ole was adjudicated permanently totally disabled, he would
likely move for excess fees, arguing that $26,000 inadequately
compensated him.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, assuming jurisdiction in both states, Ole's chances for
recovery based on "course of employment" and considering his
"traveling employee" status is much better in Wisconsin. 241 He is
unlikely to recover in Minnesota due to his deviation.
248 However, if
he could recover in either state, the length and extent of his
disability would determine which state offered better benefits. If he
is only temporarily or partially disabled, his benefits in Minnesota
would likely be greater. If, on the other hand, he is permanently
totally disabled, Wisconsin would provide greater benefits.
249
246. Irwin v. Surdyk's Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Minn. 1999).
247. See supra Part II.A.
248. See supra Part II.A.2.
249. See supra Part III.F.
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